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In recent years, directors of corporations have become increasingly
aware that they may be held personally liable for their actions taken as
directors. Often, creditors will look to the directors of an insolvent cor-
poration, hoping to find a deeper pocket from which to recover their
losses, especially during periods of economic downturn. In addition,
stockholders will often turn to the directors of the corporation when the
corporation ceases to perform as expected, and the stockholders have a
weak or nonexistent claim under the securities laws. The potential for
massive liability, when compared with the relatively minimal benefits
that an outside director can expect to receive from his position, often
causes potential outside directors to refuse such invitations. As a conse-
quence, many corporations that need the independent, knowledgeable
advice that an outside director can provide must settle for inside direc-
tors or less knowledgeable, less independent outside directors.
This article, while not exhaustive of the topic, will discuss four ma-
jor areas of potential director liability and discuss the standards involved
under each area. The four major sources of director liability arise from
(1) breach of the fiduciary duty of due care, (2) conflict of interest trans-
actions (self-dealing), (3) usurpation of corporate opportunities, and
(4) statutory liability. In relation to the fiduciary duty of due care, Colo-
rado has passed a new statute which allows corporations to limit the
monetary liability of their directors for their gross negligence. This stat-
ute and its relevant history will also be discussed in detail.
I. BREACH OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF DUE CARE
Colorado has long recognized that directors are in a fiduciary rela-
tionship to their corporation. They owe undivided loyalty to their cor-
poration and "an allegiance that is influenced in action by no
consideration other than the welfare of [their] corporation."' The di-
rectors hold an office of trust, and, accordingly, are held to the high
standard of duty required of trustees. The directors have a duty to pro-
tect the rights of the company, and to act openly and above board.
"They must manage the corporate affairs in good faith, within the limits
of the law applicable, and give the corporate entity the benefit of their
* Associate with the law firm of Cogswell and Wehrle, Denver, Colorado.
1. Kullgren v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 110 Colo. 454, 461, 135 P.2d 1007, 1010
(1943), quoted in, Hudson v. American Founders Life Ins. Co. of Denver, 151 Colo. 54, 58,
377 P.2d 391, 393 (1962). The court in Kullgren noted that directors are held "to the
extreme measure of candor, unselfishness and good faith." 110 Colo. at 461, 135 P.2d at
1010.
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best judgment and care."' 2 Moreover, directors of a corporation are "li-
able jointly and severally for losses of the corporation caused by their
bad faith or willful or intentional departures from duties, their fraudu-
lent breaches of trust, their gross or willful negligence, or their ultra
vires acts."
'3
A. Business Judgment Rule
Although directors are treated as fiduciaries, they need merely act
in accordance with the business judgment rule, which has considerable
vitality in Colorado. The business judgment rule provides that the good
faith acts of directors, which are within the powers of the corporation
and within the exercise of honest business judgment, may not be chal-
lenged. 4 Courts will not interfere with or regulate the conduct of direc-
tors who act reasonably and honestly in the exercise of their business
judgment and duties. 5 A director has a large amount of discretionary
power which is not subject to control by either the stockholders or the
courts, if exercised honestly and with reason. When the stockholders
are dissatisfied with the management of the company, their recourse is
to elect new management rather than to seek redress in the courts.
6
Although errors of judgment will not be corrected by the courts,
that judgment must be exercised with reason. 7 Colorado law suggests
that the negligent exercise ofjudgment must amount to clear and gross
negligence before the courts will hold a director liable. 8 Generally, Col-
orado courts require some evidence of fraud or self-dealing before they
will impose liability on directors. 9
The business judgment rule in its purest form only protects direc-
tors from liability for errors of judgment. It does not protect directors
from liability for negligence in the process by which they reached their
2. Great Western United Corp. v. Great Western Producers Coop., 41 Colo. App.
349, 353, 588 P.2d 380, 382 (1978), aff'd, 200 Colo. 180, 613 P.2d 873 (1980). The court
concluded that directors of Great Western United Corporation could not be held liable for
breach of contract in failing to use "best effort" to persuade shareholders to approve the
sale of its subsidiary since the directors had a fiduciary duty to the shareholders, which
included protecting the rights of the company and to act openly and above board. Id. at
353-54, 588 P.2d at 382-83.
3. Holland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co. of Denver, 151 Colo. 69, 75, 376 P.2d
162, 165 (1962).
4. See, e.g., Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 34 Colo. App. 334, 337, 526 P.2d 316, 317
(1974). Several property owners within a subdivision brought an action against their
homeowner's association to enjoin it from constructing tennis courts, claiming that the
association board acted arbitrarily in approving the tennis courts. The court determined
that the board's judgment was valid absent a showing of bad faith or fraud. Id. at 337, 526
P.2d at 317.
5. Id. at 337, 526 P.2d at 317.
6. Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094 (10th Cir. 1972) (applying Colorado
law).
7. See id.
8. Holland, 151 Colo. at 75, 376 P.2d at 166. Mere error in judgment is not enough
to impose liability upon a director.
9. See Rywalt, 34 Colo. App. at 337, 526 P.2d at 317. When a director has committed
fraud or self-dealing then he has breached the duty to act reasonably and honestly in the
exercise of his judgment.
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judgment.' 0 This statement comes as a surprise to most people given
the broad language courts have used in their statement of the business
judgment rule. For instance, in Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp.,I I the court stated that the reason for the business judg-
ment rule is that "in order to make the corporation function effectively,
those having management responsibility must have the freedom to make
in good faith the many necessary decisions quickly and finally without
the impairment of having to be liable for an honest error in judg-
ment."' 2 Of course, many decisions cannot be made "quickly and fi-
nally" unless they are made without the benefit of a complete and
thorough investigation. Further, broad dicta in Rywalt v. Writer Corp.
13
stated that courts will not "interfere with or regulate the conduct of the
directors in the reasonable and honest exercise of their judgment and
duties."' 14 Such broad statements can give directors a false sense of se-
curity in believing that they would not be liable, not only for errors of
judgment, but also for errors in investigating the facts supporting their
judgments.
B. Smith v. Van Gorkom
A recent Delaware case has demonstrated that false sense of secur-
ity. In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 15 the Delaware Supreme Court determined
that, while the business judgment rule protected the directors from per-
sonal liability for an error in judgment, it did not protect the directors
for gross negligence in failing to investigate the facts supporting their
judgment. 16 In Van Gorkom, Trans Union Corporation could not gener-
ate a sufficient amount of taxable income to utilize its substantial invest-
ment tax credits. Trans Union's earnings were principally generated
from its rail car leasing business which was very capital intensive. As a
consequence, the company had a large amount of fixed assets and a cor-
respondingly large amount of depreciation due to the accelerated cost
recovery program. The accelerated depreciation reduced Trans Union's
taxable income to such an extent that the company could not use its
investment tax credits. This problem was causing considerable concern
for the company. 17
Management's proposed solution was a leveraged buyout in which
10. Hansen, The ALl Corporate Governance Project - Of the Duty of Due Care and the Business
Judgment Rule, 41 Bus. LAw. 1237, 1240-41 (1986). The author of this article argues
strongly that the American Law Institute's standard of "due care" is flawed since it literally
requires due care in exercising judgment as well as in the process of forming a judgment.
11. 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). In an action based on
Rule 1Ob-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the court referred to the business
judgment rule in determining the timeliness of the special earning report. The court con-
cluded that the decision by directors to release such report was a matter of discretion. Id.
at 518.
12. Id. at 518.
13. 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316 (1974).
14. Id. at 335, 526 P.2d at 317 (emphasis added).
15. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
16. Id. at 872.
17. Id. at 864-65.
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the group acquiring Trans Union would have sufficient taxable income
to make use of the tax credits. Senior management had not yet com-
pleted a study to determine the necessary selling price of Trans Union's
stock in the buyout. However, management had done some preliminary
studies which indicated that a leveraged buyout would be easily feasible,
if the stock were priced at $50.00 per share, but difficult if priced at
$60.00 per share.18 At the time of the proposal, the current market
price for Trans Union stock was approximately $38.00 per share.' 9
Van Gorkom, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, vetoed the
idea of a leveraged buyout but was receptive to the idea of selling Trans
Union to a company with sufficient income to absorb the tax credits.
Accordingly, Van Gorkom, on his own initiative, entered into negotia-
tions for the sale of Trans Union. He did this without the knowledge or
approval of the board or senior management. 20 Van Gorkom eventually
struck a deal whereby Trans Union would merge into New T Company,
a subsidiary wholly owned by Jay Pritzker, at a price of $55.00 per share.
However, Pritzker attached several stipulations to this merger proposal.
First, he would be entitled to purchase one million shares of Trans
Union stock at $38.00 per share. Second, Trans Union could accept, but
could not solicit, other offers for the purchase of Trans Union. Finally,
Pritzker required that the Trans Union board of directors approve the
merger proposal within three days.
2 1
Van Gorkom called an emergency meeting of the board of directors
at which time he gave a twenty minute oral presentation of the merger
proposal. The board of directors was not given a copy of the proposed
merger documents, and Van Gorkom did not disclose the methodology
by which he determined the $55.00 per share figure. The president of
Trans Union spoke in favor of the merger proposal. The chief financial
officer of the company discussed his leveraged buyout study and stated
that the $55.00 per share figure was at the low end of a fair price range,
but his studies could not conclusively show the intrinsic value of the
company. The board meeting lasted a total of two hours, and ended
with the board ultimately approving the merger proposal.
22
The board was composed of five inside directors and five outside
directors. The five inside directors had backgrounds in law and account-
ing, with 116 years of collective employment by the company and 68
years of combined experience on its board. The five outside directors
included four chief executives of major corporations and an economist
who was former dean of a school of business. The outside directors had
78 years combined experience as chief executive officers and 50 years of
cumulative experience as directors of Trans Union.
2 3
Despite the collective experience of the directors, the court deter-
18. Id. at 865.
19. Id. at 867.
20. Id. at 866.
21. Id. at 867.
22. Id. at 867-69.
23. Id. at 880 n.21.
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mined that the board had been grossly negligent in (1) failing to ade-
quately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom's role in forcing the sale of
the company and in establishing the per share purchase price, and
(2) failing to inform themselves of the intrinsic value of the company.
24
The court stated that the business judgment rule was a presumption
that, in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interest of the company. 2 5 The business
judgment rule, however, provides no protection for directors who have
made "an unintelligent or unadvised judgment. ' 26 Further, the court
stated that whether a business judgment may be termed as informed
turns on whether the directors "have informed themselves prior to mak-
ing a business decision, of all material information reasonably available
to them."' 27 The court also noted that gross negligence would be the
standard for determining whether a business judgment was an informed
one.
28
Accordingly, the court concluded that the board was grossly negli-
gent in relying upon Van Gorkom's representations that $55.00 per
share was a fair price. The court further found that the board failed to
read the merger documents prior to approving the transactions, failed
to engage the services of an investment banker, failed to do a study of
the intrinsic value of the company, and approved the merger upon only
two hours of consideration, without prior notice and without the exigen-
cies of a crisis or emergency. The court was not persuaded by the fact
that the merger price was at a substantial premium over the current mar-
ket price, or that the board, because of its experience and long history
with the company, did not require a full scale study to know that the
$55.00 figure was a fair price for the company, or that the merger had in
fact been very beneficial for Trans Union.2 9 Rather, the court only fo-
cused on the fact that the board of directors accepted the $55.00 price
without conducting a formal investigation to determine whether that
price was the best the stockholders could receive. 30
Needless to say, Van Gorkom has caused considerable concern in cor-
porate board rooms around the country. In essence, Van Gorkom stands
for the proposition that directors can be held personally liable for failing
to conduct a formalized investigatory process before they approve a
merger price.3 ' Under the decision, a board of directors can no longer
rely upon their business acumen or their intuition that a proposed deal
will be beneficial to the corporation. Instead, the board of directors
must constantly be conscious of all of the factors that go into the deci-
24. Id. at 874.
25. Id. at 872 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
26. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
27. Id. (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811).
28. Id. at 873.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business judgment, 41
Bus. LAw. 1187, 1191 (1987).
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sion-making process, and must ensure documentation and investigation
of each factor. This may require the unnecessary hiring of an invest-
ment banker, performing an audit when corporate records could suffice,
and additional reliance upon lawyers to prepare the documents that
would provide an aura of formalism and circumspection on the part of
the board.
3 2
In addition, Van Gorkom undermines one of the most stark realities
of the business world. Good business deals often occur under extreme
time constraints. Quick business decisions can often mean the differ-
ence between being the first to market a product or business failure.
Business decisions are often made by corporate executives who have
made a career out of taking too little information, adding a little busi-
ness acumen and intuition, and producing quality decisions.
C. Legislative Response to Van Gorkom
These concerns, floating in the wake of the Van Gorkom decision,
prompted the Delaware legislature to rewrite its corporate laws to effec-
tively overrule Van Gorkom. The new statute essentially provides that a
corporation may amend its articles of incorporation to provide that cor-
porate directors may not be held liable for monetary damages to the
corporation or to its stockholders for a breach of fiduciary duty, amount-
ing to gross negligence, to the corporation.
33
Colorado also passed legislation that adopted substantially the
same statute that Delaware enacted. 3 4 The Colorado limitation of direc-
tor liability also applies to nonprofit corporations,3 5 state banks,36 and
savings and loan associations.3 7 The Colorado statute provides that a
corporation may include in its articles a provision limiting or eliminating
the personal liability of directors in the following manner:
If so provided in the articles of incorporation, to eliminate or
limit the personal liability of a director to the corporation or to
its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director; except that such provision shall not elimi-
nate or limit the liability of a director to the corporation or to
its shareholders for monetary damages for: Any breach of the
director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or to its sharehold-
ers; acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve inten-
tional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; acts specified
in section 7-5-114; or any transaction from which the director
derived an improper personal benefit. No such provision shall
eliminate or limit the liability of a director to the corporation or
to its shareholders for monetary damages for any act or omis-
32. See id. at 1191-92. The authors comically note that, in addition, directors, who are
more intent on formalism than business, may make poorer decisions.
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986).
34. H.R. 1142, 56th Colo. Gen. Assembly §§ 1-2 (1987)(to be codified at CoLo. REV.
STAT. §§ 7-2-102(1.5)(d), 7-3-101(1)(u)).
35. Id. at §§ 3-4 (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-21-102(1.5), 7-22-101(l)(r)).
36. Id. at § 5 (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-3-101(2.5)).
37. Id. at § 6 (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-41-112(1)(n)).
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sion occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes
effective.
38
Essentially, the statute allows a corporation to eliminate the per-
sonal liability of a director for his simple or gross negligence. The Colo-
rado statute is merely a restatement of the business judgment rule with
the exception that it protects against gross negligence. Of course, the
negligent decisions of directors, made in good faith, have always been
protected under the business judgment rule,3 9 unlike intentional mis-
conduct, self-dealing, 40 and statutory liability, 4 1 which were not cov-
ered. Accordingly under the business judgment rule, clear and gross
negligence did not survive. 4 2 Although the new statute does protect di-
rectors for acts of gross negligence, it does not make an explicit excep-
tion for gross negligence, as it does for breaches of loyalty, bad faith,
intentional misconduct, or statutory liability.
The courts might construe gross negligence as an act not taken in
good faith. "Good faith" has been variously defined but is generally
used to describe a state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom
from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful
to one's duty or obligation. It may mean an honesty of purpose, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the actor
upon inquiry rather than diligence or non-negligence. 43 The Uniform
Commercial Code defines "good faith" to mean honesty in fact.
44
Gross negligence, on the other hand, consists of a conscious or volun-
tary act likely to result in harm of which the actor is or reasonably should
be aware. 4 5 To the extent that gross negligence includes a conscious
disregard of duty, creditors and shareholders could reasonably argue
that such acts are not taken in good faith.
Although it may be argued that negligence constitutes lack of good
faith, the argument should fail because it ignores the history and intent
of the Delaware statute. The new statute was passed by Delaware in
response to a case holding directors personally liable for their gross
negligence. Clearly, if the statute is to add anything beyond what the
38. Id. at § 2 (to be codified at CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101(l)(u)).
39. See Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316 (1974)(stating that
the acts must be within the boundaries established by the corporation's articles and the
exercise of honest business judgment); see also supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 55-80 and accompanying text.
41. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
42. Holland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co. of Denver, 151 Colo. 69, 376 P.2d
162 (1962); see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
43. See Wendling v. Cundall, 568 P.2d 888, 890 (Wyo. 1977)(the Wyoming Supreme
Court attempted to define the term "utmost good faith" which was present in a contract);
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 623-24 (5th ed. 1979); 18A WORDS & PHRASES 83, 106-09 (1956
& Supp. 1986); cf. Whitlock v. Alexander, 160 N.C. 465, 76 S.E.2d 538 (1972)(requiring
"good sense and reasonable business prudence").
44. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 4-1-201(19) (1973).
45. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 43, at 931-32. Colorado does not recognize
the concept of gross negligence, but defines willful and wanton negligence similarly. Ad-
ams v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 49 Colo. 475, 113 P. 1010 (1922); Foster v. Redding, 97
Colo. 4, 45 P.2d 940 (1935).
1988]
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common law has already provided, it must eliminate director liability for
gross negligence.
The new statute also may not protect directors from personal liabil-
ity for their recklessness. To the extent that the Colorado courts define
recklessness as including some element of intent, such actions could
constitute either intentional misconduct or acts taken not in good faith.
Recklessness is generally defined to be action taken either with knowl-
edge of the danger or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the
danger to a reasonable man. 46 A reckless act is one that is intentionally
done with the knowledge that there is a significant risk of harm to
others. 4 7 Note that the difference between recklessness and gross negli-
gence is minuscule. 4 8 If the courts determined that gross negligence
could not support liability under the new statute, but recklessness could,
courts could with little effort transform a grossly negligent act by a di-
rector into a reckless act. Therefore, considering the intent of the legis-
lature and the history of the new statute, recklessness and gross
negligence also should not support personal liability under this statute.
Other than the items specifically excluded from the statute, it is im-
portant to note what the statute does not protect against. The statute
does not itself eliminate or limit the personal liability of directors. The
corporation must act by amending its articles of incorporation in order
to shield its directors from liability. 49 A problem of construction arises
from this provision since some corporations already include limitations
of liability in their articles similar to those allowed by the statute. The
question arises as to whether the grossly negligent action of a director,
which was taken after the articles were amended to include the limitation
of liability, but prior to the effective date of the statute, will be protected
from liability. Essentially, can a corporation limit the liability of a direc-
tor through its articles of incorporation prior to the effective date of this
statute?
Fletcher seems to suggest this is possible although no persuasive
authority for the proposition is cited. 50 The authority cited by Fletcher
is a Colorado case, holding that article provisions relieving directors of
liability for conflict of interest transactions "create no license to steal"
and will not validate unfair transactions. 5' In any event, the new statute
seems to presume that such provisions were invalid prior to its
enactment.
52
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965); see Hackbart v. Cincinnati Ben-
gals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 524 (10th Cir. 1979).
47. Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 524.
48. Both recklessness and gross negligence require the knowledge or reasonable
knowledge of a danger which is likely to occur. Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 43, at 931-32 and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 46, at § 500.
49. H.R. 1142, 56th Colo. Gen. Assembly, §§ 2, 4-6 (1987) (to be codified at COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 7-3-101(1)(u), 7-22-101(1)(r), 11-3-101(2.5), 11-41-112(l)(n)).
50. 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1047 (rev.
perm. ed. 1986).
51. Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687, 701 (D. Colo. 1972).
52. The argument would be that the legislature would not have passed a law allowing
[Vol. 65:1
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Second, the new statute will not protect action of a director taken in
a capacity other than that of a director. 53 For instance, if a director who
is also the president of a corporation takes an action in his capacity as
president rather than as director, he will be subject to monetary liability
in the same manner as any other officer of a corporation.
Finally, the statute does not protect a board of directors against de-
claratory or injunctive relief or a claim for rescission. It only protects
the director against monetary liability. 54 Therefore, a director may still
incur personal attorney fees, and, if appropriate, be assessed attorney
fees for the opposing party, in a suit not seeking monetary liability
against the director personally.
Thus, the new statute should not be construed as the solution for all
the problems presently faced by directors. It contains difficult construc-
tional problems, such as whether gross negligence or recklessness will
constitute acts not taken in good faith. Additionally, it does not protect
directors from personal involvement in litigation seeking non-monetary
damages. To the extent that the new statute prevents the occurrence of
cases such as Van Gorkom, however, it is a step in the right direction to
allow free and unencumbered decision-making by directors.
II. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF LOYALTY AND GOOD FAITH
A. Conflict of Interest Transactions
Directors, as fiduciaries, owe their undivided loyalty to the corpora-
tion. In Colorado, this principle was first announced in Kuligren v. Navy
Gas & Supply Co.5 5 The court stated:
A director of a corporation is in the position of a fiduciary; that
is a principle deeply rooted in our law. He owes loyalty and
allegiance to his corporation, a loyalty that is undivided and an
allegiance that is influenced in action by no consideration other
than the welfare of his corporation. He is held in official action,
to the extreme measure of candor, unselfishness, and good
faith. Those principles are rigid, essential and salutary.
56
Historically, transactions between an interested director and his
corporation have been considered voidable by the corporation. 5 7 The
rule of strict voidability, however, has been slowly repudiated as courts
the corporation to limit the liability of its directors if it believed that corporations already
had such power.
53. H.R. 142, 56th Colo. Gen. Assembly §§ 2, 4-6 (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 7-3-101(1)(r), 7-22-101(l)(r), 11-3-101(2.5), 11-41-112(1)(n)).
54. Id.
55. 110 Colo. 454, 135 P.2d 1007 (1943).
56. Id. at 461, 135 P.2d at 1010 (quoting Turner v. American Metal Co., 36 N.Y.S.2d
356, 369 (1942), rev'd, 268 A.D. 239, 50 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1944), appeal dismissed, 295 N.Y.
822, 66 N.E.2d 591 (1946)).
57. See de La Garza, Conflict of Interest Transactions: Fiduciary Duties of Coiporation Directois
Who are also Controlling Shareholders, 57 DEN. U.L. REv. 609, 619-22 (1980); see also. Morgan
v. King, 27 Colo. 539, 555, 63 P. 416, 421 (1900); Glengary Consol. Mining Co. v.
Boehmer, 28 Colo. 1, 4, 62 P. 839, 840 (1900); Mosher v. Sinnott, 20 Colo. App. 454, 458,
79 P. 742, 743 (1905).
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recognized that interested transactions may be beneficial to the corpora-
tion.58 Today, most states, including Colorado, have adopted statutes
repudiating the rule of strict voidability. These statutes provide that no
contract or transaction between a corporation and one or more of its
directors shall be either void or voidable because of the relationship or
interest of the director if one of several conditions is met. 59
Literally read, Colorado's statute allows a corporation and its direc-
tors to retain the benefits of an interested transaction if any of the three
conditions are met. Thus, the director would not be liable on the basis
of the interested transaction if (1) a majority of the disinterested direc-
tors voted for the transaction, (2) a majority of the shareholders,
whether interested or not, voted for the transaction, or (3) it was fair to
the corporation. Under this strict interpretation, an unfair transaction
would not be voidable so long as one of the first two criteria was met.
Accordingly, an interested director, who was also a majority share-
holder, could engage in an interested transaction which was unfair to
the corporation so long as he, as a majority shareholder, voted in favor
of the transaction.
However, the correct analysis does not involve a strict interpreta-
tion of the statute for two reasons. First, the statute itself states that the
transaction will not be voidable solely because it is an interested transac-
tion.60 If the transaction is both interested and unfair, a court of equity
may void the transaction even though it is supported by disinterested
director approval or shareholder approval. 6 1 Second, a transaction is
not necessarily validated simply because one of the three criteria is met.
The statute only states that the transaction will not be voidable solely on
the basis that the transaction was interested. 62 It does not state that the
58. E. BRODSKY & N.P. ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 3:01
(1984).
59. Colorado's statute provides:
(1) No contract or transaction between a corporation and one or more of its di-
rectors, or between a corporation and any other corporation, partnership, associ-
ation, or other organization in which one or more of its directors or officers are
directors or officers or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely
for that reason or solely because the director or officer is present at or partici-
pates in the meeting of the board or committee thereof which authorizes, ap-
proves, or ratifies the contract or transaction solely because his or their votes are
counted for such purpose if:
(a) The material fact as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract
or transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors or the commit-
tee, and the board or committee in good faith authorizes, approves, or ratifies the
contract or transaction by the affirmative vote of a majority of the disinterested
directors, even though the disinterested directors are less than quorum; or
(b) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract
or transaction are disclosed or are known to the shareholders entitled to vote
thereon, and the contract or transaction is specifically authorized, approved, or
ratified in good faith by vote of the shareholders; or
(c) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is
authorized, approved, or ratified by the board of directors, a committee thereof,
or the shareholders.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5(1) (1986).
60. Id.
61. See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
62. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5(1).
CORPORATE DIRECTOR LIABILITY
transaction is valid if the criteria are met. Although the technical re-
quirements of the statute are fulfilled, transactions that are unfair and
unreasonable may still be considered invalid. 63 Indeed, it would be in-
congruous for the courts to hold that a majority shareholder, simply by
disclosing his purpose to injure the majority shareholders, could make
his interested transaction not voidable under the statute.
If each interested transaction must be fair to the corporation and
the minority shareholders, does the director or the challenging share-
holder have the burden with respect to fairness? Under Colorado law,
the burden has always been on the director to prove the fairness of his
transaction with the corporation. 64 Section 7-5-114.5 does not alter that
burden.6 5 The fact that the transaction received disinterested director
approval or shareholder approval does not and should not relieve the
director of the burden of proving fairness to the corporation.
6 6
In this regard, the American Law Institute has proposed changes to
its Model Business Corporation Act, upon which Colorado's statute is
based, which allows the burden of proof of fairness to shift to the share-
holder under certain circumstances. In the case of disinterested share-
holder approval, the burden will be on the party challenging the
transaction to prove that the transaction constituted a waste of corpo-
rate assets. 67 In the case of disinterested director approval, the challeng-
63. Rivercity v. American Can Co., 600 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd, 753 F.2d
1300 (5th Cir. 1985)(a mere disclosure of impropriety does not remove the taint of unfair-
ness nor allow director to take advantage of an opportunity at the expense of the corpora-
tion); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66
(1952)(a director is not allowed to obtain an unfair advantage or profit at the expense of
the corporation).
64. Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Minerals Co., 157 Colo. 1, 403 P.2d 758 (1965).
65. Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126 (Wyo. 1985)(applying Wvo. STAT. § 17-1-136.1
(1977), which is substantially similar to Colorado's statute).
66. Fliegler, 361 A.2d at 221; see also Gelb, Corporate Disloyalty - A Wyoming Case and the
ALI Project, 21 LAND & WATER L. REV. 111, 119-27 (1986).
67. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.02
(Tent. Draft No. 5 1985). The draft reads as follows:
(a) General Rule. A director or senior executive who enters into a transaction
with the corporation (other than a transaction involving the payment of compen-
sation) fulfills his duty of loyalty to the corporation with respect to the transaction
if:
(1) Disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the transaction is
made to the corporate decisionmaker who authorizes or ratifies the transac-
tion; and
(2) (A) the transaction is fair to the corporation when entered into; or
(B) the transaction is authorized, following such disclosure, by dis-
interested directors, and could reasonably be believed to be fair to the corpo-
ration at the time of such authorization; or
(C) the transaction is authorized or ratified, following such disclo-
sures, by disinterested shareholders, and does not constitute a waste of cor-
porate assets at the time of the shareholder action.
(b) Burden of Proof" Ratification of Defective Disclosure. A party who challenges a
transaction between the director or senior executive and the corporation has the
burden of proof, except that the director or the senior executive has the burden
of proving that the transaction is fair to the corporation if the transaction was not
authorized by disinterested directors, or authorized or ratified by disinterested
shareholders, following disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the
transaction. The disclosure requirements of § 5.02(a)(1) will be deemed to be
satisfied at any time (but no later than a reasonable time after suit is filed chal-
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ing party will have the burden of proving that the disinterested directors
could not reasonably have believed the transaction to be fair to the
corporation.
68
B. Usurpation of a Corporate Opportunity
Under the corporate opportunity doctrine, a corporate officer or di-
rector must refrain from entering into activities in competition with the
corporation or from acquiring assets in which the corporation has an
interest. The general rule is stated as follows:
An officer of a corporation is duty bound to purchase property
for the corporation, or to refrain from purchasing property for
himself, if the corporation has an interest, actual or in expec-
tancy, in the property or if the purchase of the property by the
officer or director may hinder or defeat the plans and purposes
of the corporation's legitimate business.
6 9
Before a director is prevented from acquiring such assets, the corpora-
tion must show an interest or expectancy in the property. To demon-
strate this, the corporation must establish that not only did the property
possess value to it, but that it had a practical, not a mere theoretical, use
for it. 70 Further, the director owes no specific duty to use or pledge his
personal funds to enable the corporation to take advantage of the
opportunity.71
Merely because a corporation is negotiating for the purchase of the
property does not establish an expectancy or interest. The corporation
must show not only that it was interested in the property, but that it had
a specific use for the property. 72 Thus, although a corporation would
like to have an asset and is negotiating for it, the company does not have
an opportunity capable of protection unless it has a defined use to which
the property could be put. This is a very difficult standard for the corpo-
ration to meet, for it must show not only that it had the financial re-
sources to acquire the opportunity but that it had a present intention to
purchase, and that it could use the property once it exercised the
opportunity.
The extent to which Colorado courts go to avoid the corporate op-
portunity doctrine is evidenced by Carper v. Frost Oil Co. 73 In this case,
W.H. Malone, the corporation's attorney, one of its directors, and its
general manager, was dispatched to Louisiana to negotiate for the
lenging the transaction) the transaction is ratified, following such disclosure, by
the board, the shareholder, or the corporate decisionmaker who initially ap-
proved the transaction or his successor.
68. Id.; see also Gelb, supra note 66, for a full discussion of this topic.
69. Three G Corp. v. Daddis, 714 P.2d 1333, 1336 (Colo. App. 1986). Three G Cor-
poration had brought an action against the former officer and controlling shareholder for
recovery of damages and real property. However, as the court found, Three G Corpora-
tion had no intention to purchase the real property because of its financial condition.
Thus, the corporation had no interest in the property. Id.
70. Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris, 97 Colo. 309, 313, 49 P.2d 429, 431 (1935).
71. Three G Corp., 714 P.2d at 1336.
72. See Colorado & Utah Coal Co., 97 Colo. at 310-11, 49 P.2d at 430-31.
73. 72 Colo. 345, 211 P. 370 (1922).
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purchase of oil lands for the corporation. During the trip, Malone
purchased oil producing property for himself and the president of the
corporation. When the corporation attempted to recover that property,
the court determined that no corporate opportunity existed. 74 The
court held that the evidence did not establish that the corporation could
have acquired the same land at a reasonable price. Furthermore, the cor-
poration could not be certain that it could have purchased the land even
if Malone had not. Moreover, Malone was sent to Louisiana not as a
purchaser of oil lands but as a general manager of the company. In that
capacity, he was not authorized to purchase oil lands for the corpora-
tion. From these facts, the court determined that no corporate opportu-
nity existed. Under current law in states other than Colorado, Malone
would have been ordered to hold the oil property in constructive trust
for the corporation.
75
Under the widely accepted rule of corporate opportunity:
[I]f there is presented to a corporate officer or director a busi-
ness opportunity which the corporation is financially able to
undertake, is from its nature, in the line of the corporation's
business and is of practical advantage to it, is one in which the
corporation has an interest or a reasonable expectancy, and by
embracing the opportunity, the self-interest of the officer or di-
rector will be brought into conflict with that of his corporation,
the law will not permit him to seize the opportunity for
himself.
76
Applying this standard to the Frost Oil case, the oil producing properties
were in the line of business of the corporation, it had an interest in the
property, and the interest of the corporation and the officer were in con-
flict because of the officer's purchase. Under the Guth v. Loft, Inc.7 7 test,
the interest of the corporation need not be actual and practical but need
only be "reasonable."- 78 Colorado, therefore, has departed from the
general rules of the corporate opportunity doctrine, and will allow direc-
tors wide latitude in choosing the properties that they buy.
Colorado case law also prohibits the director from engaging "in en-
terprises directly in competition with, and necessarily having injurious,
crippling, or detrimental effect upon, the corporation's business."
' 79
This duty is similar to the corporate opportunity doctrine since a com-
peting business takes away opportunities that a corporation ordinarily
would have. Only one Colorado case, however, has affirmatively im-
posed this duty upon a director.8 0 It is unclear to what extent Colorado
74. Id. at 348-49, 211 P. at 371.
75. See Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 222 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1974)(opportunity and
any property acquired becomes subject to a constructive trust for the benefit of the
corporation).
76. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Cas. 255, 263, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (1939).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Williams v. Stirling, 40 Colo. App. 463, 466, 583 P.2d 290, 292 (1978).
80. Id.; see also Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris, 97 Colo. 309, 49 P.2d 429 (1935)
(if the director owes no duty to act or contract for the corporation with respect to property
in question, he is at liberty to act for himself).
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courts will enforce this fiduciary duty not to compete.
III. STATUTORY LIABILITY
In Colorado, under section 7-5-114, a director will be liable to the
corporation if one of four circumstances are found to exist: 8 1 (1) if the
director allows the corporation to pay dividends while it is insolvent;
(2) if the director allows the corporation to purchase its own shares
when it has no surplus to do so; (3) if the director allows the corporation
to distribute assets to its shareholders in liquidation without providing
for known debts; and (4) if the director allows the corporation to make a
loan to the director of the corporation without the affirmative vote of
two-thirds of the shareholders.
82
Under section 7-5-114(1)(a), if a director votes for or assents to a
dividend or other distribution to the corporation's shareholders "con-
trary to the provisions of this code or contrary to any restrictions con-
tained in the articles of incorporation," he will be liable to the
corporation jointly and severally with the other directors voting for the
dividend or distribution. 8 3 A dividend would be contrary to the provi-
81. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114(1) (1986). Section 7-5-114, in part, states:
Liability of Directors on Certain Cases. (1)In addition to any other liabilities, a
director shall be liable in the following circumstances unless he complies with the
standard provided in this code for performance of duties of directors:
(a) A director who votes for or assents to the declaration of any dividend
or other distribution of the assets of a corporation to its shareholders con-
trary to the provisions of this code or contrary to any restrictions contained
in the articles of incorporation shall be liable to the corporation, jointly and
severally with all other directors so voting or assenting, for the amount of
such dividend which is paid or the value of such assets which are distributed
in excess of the amount of such dividend or distribution which could have
been paid or distributed without a violation of the provisions of this code or
restrictions in the article of incorporation.
(c) A director who votes for or assents to any distribution of assets of a
corporation to its shareholders during the liquidation of the corporation
without the payment and discharge of, or the making of adequate provision
for, all known debts, obligations, and liabilities of the corporation shall be
liable to the corporation, jointly or severally with all other directors so voting
or assenting, for the value of such assets which are distributed, to the extent
that such debts, obligations and liabilities of the corporation are not thereaf-
ter paid and discharged.
(d) The directors of a corporation who vote for or assent to the making
or guaranteeing of a loan to a director of the corporation (unless the voting
procedure specified in § 7-3-101(l)(f) has been followed), or the making or
guaranteeing of any loan to a director secured by shares of the corporation,
shall be jointly and severally liable to the corporation for the amount of such
loan or guarantee until the repayment thereof.
(2) Any director against whom a claim is asserted under this section for the
payment of a dividend or other distribution of assets of a corporation and who is
held liable for such claims shall be entitled to contribution from the shareholders
who accepted or received any such dividend or assets, knowing such dividend or
distribution to have been made in violation of this code, in proportion to the
amounts received by them.
(3) Any director against whom a claim is asserted under this section is enti-
tled to contribution from the other directors who voted or assented to the action
upon which the claim is asserted and who could be liable under the circumstances
stated in subsection (1) of this section.




sions of the code if it were made when the corporation was insolvent, or
when payment of the dividend would render the corporation insolvent,
or when the declaration or payment of the dividend would be contrary
to any restrictions in the articles of incorporation.
84
The directors of the corporation are absolutely liable for violations
of this and the other provisions of section 7-5-114.85 The director's only
method of avoiding liability is to prove one of the statutory defenses. 86
In the case of dividends, the director would have to prove that one of
the exceptions to the proscription against dividends while insolvent was
met.87
Under section 7-5-1 14(l)(b), a director who votes for or assents to a
purchase by the corporation of its own shares "contrary to the provi-
sions of this code" is liable to the corporation jointly and severally with
the other directors voting for the purchase of any amount in excess of
the amount that could have been paid in accordance with the provisions
of the statute.8 8 Generally, the corporation may purchase its own shares
only to the extent that it has unreserved and unrestricted surplus.8 9 No
showing of fraud is required to impose liability under this section.9 0
The liability of the directors, however, is limited. The directors are only
liable to the extent that the amount paid upon the repurchase exceeds
the amount statutorily allowed. 9 ' In fact, under all of the statutory lia-
bility sections, the directors are only liable to the extent that their ac-
tions exceed the provisions of the code. Under prior law, a violation of
84. Id. at § 7-5-110(1) (1986). This statutory rule is subject to several provisions
which limit its effect. First, corporations engaged in the business of exploiting natural
resources may pay dividends out of depletion reserves, so long as those dividends do not
reduce the net assets of the corporation below an amount required to pay preferred stock-
holders. Id. at § 7-5-1 10(l)(b). Second, the corporation may declare a dividend in its own
treasury shares. Id. at § 7-5-1 10(l)(c). Third, any corporation may pay dividends in excess
of its stated capital, so long as that dividend does not reduce the net assets of the corpora-
tion below an amount equal to stated capital plus any amounts other than stated capital
sufficient to liquidate the interest of preferred shareholders. Id. at § 7-5-1 10(l)(d). Fi-
nally, the company may make a dividend of its own authorized but unissued shares out of
any unreserved and unrestricted surplus, so long as the board assigns to the stated capital
the par value or the assessed value of any shares so issued. Id. at § 7-5-110(l)(e)(I).
85. Security Nat'l Bank v. Peters, Writer and Christensen, Inc., 39 Colo. App. 344,
569 P.2d 875 (1977)(under the present statutes, damages are based directly upon injuries
suffered by corporation as opposed to a liquidated measure without regard to injury).
86. Id.
87. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
88. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114(l)(b) (1986).
89. Id. at § 7-3-102(1) (1986). Once again, this general restriction is subject to several
exceptions. Section 7-3-102(3) states:
Notwithstanding the limitation of subsection (1) of this section, a corporation
may purchase or otherwise acquire its own shares for the purpose of:
(a) Eliminating fractional shares;
(b) Collecting or compromising indebtedness to the corporation;
(c) Paying dissenting shareholders entitled to payment for their shares under
the provisions of this code;
(d) Effecting, subject to the other provisions of this code, the retirement of
its redeemable shares by redemption or by purchase so as not to exceed the re-
demption price.
90. Secrity Natl Bank, 39 Colo. App. 344, 569 P.2d 875.
91. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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provisions substantially similar to section 7-5-114 would have subjected
the director to liability for all debts of the corporation. 9 2 The prior stat-
ute was considered penal in nature while the current statute is consid-
ered remedial.
93
The third method of statutory liability is self-explanatory. If the di-
rectors allow the corporation to liquidate and distribute assets to the
shareholders without first providing that all of the debts of the corpora-
tion are satisfied, then the directors will be liable for those debts not
paid.9 4 In essence, the directors must ensure that the corporation re-
tains assets sufficient to satisfy all known obligations of the
corporation.
9 5
The final method by which the directors may become liable is when
the directors allow the corporation to make or guarantee a loan to a
director in violation of the statute, or make or guarantee a loan to a
director secured by shares in the corporation. 96 Unless the articles of
incorporation state otherwise, a loan to a director must be affirmed by a
vote of two-thirds of the outstanding shares entitled to vote. 9 7 It is im-
portant to note that if the directors make a loan to another director se-
cured by shares of the corporation, the directors are personally liable on
the debt until it is paid, regardless of whether the shareholders voted in
favor of the loan.
9 8
When any of the above provisions are violated, creditors of the cor-
poration, as a group, may sue to recover the funds. 99 While each of the
above provisions state that the liability of the director is "to the corpora-
tion," the courts have reasoned that the creditors, as a group, may en-
force the rights of the corporation so that they may have a fund from
which to satisfy their obligations.' 0 0 This does not mean that any credi-
tor may sue for a violation of the above provisions. A creditor may not
sue individually since such a suit would be to the detriment of other
creditors.' 0 l While the creditors must sue as a whole, they need not
prove that the violation actually caused their damages. 10 2 Liability is
predicated solely upon violation of the statute, and not upon damages
caused thereby.
92. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-5-110 (1986), § 31-5-10 (1963), § 31-31-10 (1953 &
Perm. Supp. 1960), § 31-2-12 (1953); Guarantee Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Holzwarth, 148
Colo. 366, 366 P.2d 377 (1961); Fitzgerald v. Marshall, 161 F. Supp. 470 (D. Colo. 1958).
93. Security Nat'l Bank, 39 Colo. App. at 349, 569 P.2d at 879.
94. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114(1)(c) (1986).
95. Ficor, Inc. v. McHugh, 639 P.2d 385, 394-95 (Colo. 1982).
96. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114(1)(d).
97. H.R. 1142, 56th Colo. Gen. Assembly § 2 (1987) (to be codified at CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 7-3-101(l)(0).
98. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
99. Ficor, Inc., 639 P.2d at 393.
100. Id.
101. Id. (distinguishing Rosebud Corp. v. Boggio, 39 Colo. App. 84, 561 P.2d 367
(1977)).





Corporate directors may face liability from several different angles.
The four that have been discussed in this article - due care, conflict of
interest, usurpation of corporate opportunity and statutory liability -
are the most common. The new Colorado statute can give directors
some security with regard to violations of the duty of due care. They
now know that they may not be held personally liable for their negligent
exercise of judgment. The question remains whether they will be pro-
tected if they are grossly negligent or reckless. In conflict of interest
situations, the trend is towards favoring such transactions, provided that
they are fair to the corporation. If there has been disinterested director
or disinterested shareholder approval, the trend is to place the burden
of proving unfairness upon the challenging party. Colorado seems to
refuse to invoke the corporate opportunity doctrine unless the circum-
stances are particularly egregious. Directors should be aware that they
must give the corporation a chance to purchase the property although
they may proceed with their own acquisition if the corporation has no
expectancy or interest, and the director need not pledge his own funds
to aid the corporate acquisition. The statutory liability of directors is
straightforward in prohibiting them from committing certain acts. The
liability is absolute, if there has been an injury to the corporation.
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